Reviewed by Francine L. Dolins Department of Psychology Polytechnic University Six Metrotech Center Brooklyn, NY 11201 USA fdolins@poly.edu Are humans ever the same with nothing lost out of nature? Lee Dugatkin’s book, Cheating Monkeys and Citizen Bees (1999), is primarily about non-human animal cooperative behavior, models and systems. Yet a parallel, problematic discourse in the text focuses on a related subject: potential applications of non-human animal examples to enhance and increase cooperation in human society. Despite this drawback, the book is extremely informative and well organized, aimed at a college level and non-scientific audience. It falls into the genre of scientific writing for those interested in the natural history of animals. In the book, Dugatkin presents the “four paths to cooperation” using catchy chapter titles such as “All in the Family” and “One Good Turn Deserves Another”. Sandwiched between introductory and conclusion chapters, each of the four theoretical chapters is neatly divided into the presentation of theory and concepts for each of the four types of cooperation summarized by Dugatkin: kin selection, reciprocity, mutualism, and group selection. Relevant animal examples are discussed from their theoretical and natural history perspectives. I particularly enjoyed Dugatkin’s discussion of the sister bees engaging in being “Insect Police” in his chapter All in the Family (pg. 48). Dugatkin’s presentation of Prisoner’s Dilemma and reciprocity is an excellent introduction to the subject along with an accompanying example of hermaphroditic fish “Playing Fast and Loose with Sperm and Eggs” (pg. 90). While the examples of different cooperative animals and contexts are diverse, fewer examples but with greater detail provided may have added weight to the book. The discussion of cooperative breeding in bee-eaters, for example, would have been enhanced by an explanation of how (using what behavioral, morphological, or chemical mechanism) the fathers interfere with their sons’ breeding attempts (pg. 62). A good kin selection story of ultra-cooperative naked mole rats, an example of an unusually cooperative mammalian species, could have been even more informative had it provided answers as to how naked mole rats establish roles within colonies (ie., how does one female become the Queen, how do the others become the workers, and how does the Queen suppress worker’s reproduction and remain the only female reproducing for the rest of the colony?) (pg. 54). Of great interest was the fourth chapter on group selection, stating the current thought on why group selection is a potential evolutionary mechanism. Careful not to confuse readers with the previous theoretical stance by V. C. Wynn-Edwards, Dugatkin clearly explains contemporary ideas on group selection. He presents an excellent discussion of the contentious issues such as whether natural selection can have an effect on not only the gene and the individual, but also on the group level, and whether a group organization of individuals can respond in functionally, adaptive ways. Dugatkin reminds us that Darwin stated in his The Descent of Man, that those individuals who were willing to sacrifice for their group would be “victorious” over other groups, and that this was an example of natural selection at work. Accordingly, Dugatkin points out that group selection is a selective force when it selects for cooperators within groups that are competing with other groups: the group that maintains the most cooperators (and least number of cheaters) will ultimately fare the best. Thus, in contexts where between-group competition exists, selection favors cooperators and cooperation on the group level. One could equally argue, however, that this selective force is an example of mutualism: individuals selfishly cooperate with many other individuals who are in their “group” in order to benefit in the competition with other individuals in other groups. Where Cheating Monkeys and Citizen Bees is problematic, however, is the application of animal models of cooperation to human contexts, culminating in an ultimate chapter lined with misty references to religion, morality, and the author’s opinions on the use of animals as food and pets. This ending leaves the reader with a superficial understanding of the author’s conclusions, and disappointment that the reader can neither agree nor disagree with the author based on any information given, but must be purely subjected to un-verified opinions. In explaining the application of animal models to humans, Dugatkin writes that, “animal cooperation shows us what to expect when the complex web of human social networks, as well as the laws and norms found in all human societies, are absent, and so these studies act as a sort of baseline from which to operate” (pg. 14). To be fair, Dugatkin is fully aware of the sociobiological leaps he takes. He writes, “One could argue that we humans are so different from animals that any attempt to study a phenomenon in animals is completely irrelevant with respect to that phenomenon in humans”(pg. 16). Relying on the Darwinian argument of evolutionary continuity amongst species, he further supports this point using the distant fruit fly and yeast, with their comparable homologous genes, as examples of how information gleaned from these sources are scientifically applicable to humans. In essence, throughout this book, there is a palpably clear but unstated question as to whether humans are, or are not, part of nature. In contrast to his earlier stated position of ‘continuity of species’, Dugatkin distinguishes human cooperation from that of other animals by stating that animal models provide us with a basic version of a particular behavior without any force of “moral will and freedom” being involved. It is this distinction of human behavior as being transformed through morality that is most disturbing to the continuity of the book. The kernel of Dugatkin’s hypothesis maintains an inconsistency: while we can study cooperative behavior in animals to enhance human cooperation and morality, yet our morality is totally unique as not to have any evolutionary continuity with other animals. He writes that contrary to his own beliefs, “…some have argued that one reason we can use animal examples to understand human nature is that some animals possess a rudimentary form of morality. It would require a separate book to elaborate on why I do not hold that view…” (pg. 14). It appears that Dugatkin both agrees and disagrees with the quote by John Dryden, “For mankind is ever the same, and nothing is lost out of nature, though everything is altered.” (as quoted by Tuchman, B. W.,1978). In fact, according to Dugatkin, nonhuman animals possess no inherent worth and exist solely for human’s use and betterment. Thus, animals have no moral worth, nor do they engender moral treatment in any absolute sense, that is, unless humans, the species on earth possessing the unique moral state, find it within to bestow upon animals. Instead of concluding with thoughts concurrent on the subject of cooperation, especially concerning non-human animals, in the few last paragraphs of the book Dugatkin presents a tightly packed, non-comprehensive survey of his philosophical, moral and religious thoughts about human cooperation and society. Simplistically, Dugatkin surmises that, “Many, but not all, of the issues dividing evolution and religion disappear, of course, when one realizes that science is about understanding the natural world and religion focuses on the supernatural aspects of existence” (pg. 171). Dugatkin also writes, “ I’m interested in everything science can tell us about our natural world, but I see great dangers in throwing out religion and God in the search for understanding” (pg. 171). Perhaps the addition of philosophical thought, the juncture between the natural world and that of the metaphysical, would provide insight to the simplistic distinction Dugatkin proposes? Books for non-scientists and students on interesting ethological subjects such as cooperation in animals should not be stages for moralizing, rather they should be avenues for educating and enlightening as to the mysteries of the natural, physical world. The moral gesturing, biblical references, and comparisons to humans and their societies is not a pre-requisite for making a book, such as this one, interesting and relevant. It already is fascinating by virtue of its subject and the examples included therein. In the final pages of his book, Dugatkin wrote, “I believe that the worth of animals does indeed lie in their relationship to humans. Inherently, other species are not important.” (pg. 173). Ending this review, I pose a question: if animals do not have intrinsic worth, then why is it that we care about their behavior enough to want to study them? 1. “For mankind is ever the same, and nothing is lost out of nature, though everything is altered.” John Dryden, as quoted by Tuchman, B. W. (1978). A Distant Mirror. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. HOW TO CITE THIS REVIEW: Dolins, Francine. Review of Cheating Monkeys and Citizen Bees, by Lee Dugatkin, Harvard University Press, 1999. Primate-Science Book Reviews, Primate-Science List Serve, May 2002. [URL: http://www.primate.wisc.edu/pin/review/dolins.html]
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